Abstract: This paper proposes a secure address configuration protocol for IPv6-based vehicular networks. In this protocol, the network architecture is proposed. In this architecture, a vehicle obtains a unique address from a neighbor vehicle or an access point without DAD, and a leaving vehicle's address space can be automatically reclaimed for reassignment. Based on this architecture, the address configuration algorithm is presented. In this algorithm, an access point or a vehicle owns the unique address space and assigns a unique address to a neighbor vehicle without DAD, so the address configuration cost and delay are lowered. The identification of a vehicle can be authenticated, so the security is achieved. This paper evaluates the performance of this protocol. The data results show that this protocol effectively improves the address configuration performance.
good node can be prevented from obtaining an address.
• Replay attack: if a malicious node intercepts an address request message, then it can resend the same address request message to claim as many IP addresses as possible in order to exhaust address resources and consume network resources. Moreover, if a malicious node intercepts an address response message, then it can retransmit the same address response message to a new node in order to cause address conflict. This paper aims to propose an address configuration protocol for vehicular networks in order to solve the following problems: 1) Achieve the address configuration objectives, namely dynamic, uniqueness, scalability and security.
2) Reduce the address configuration cost and delay. This paper has the following contributions:
1) The architecture for vehicular networks is proposed. In this architecture, a vehicle obtains a unique address from a neighbor vehicle or an AP(Access point) without DAD, and the address spaces occupied by leaving vehicles can be automatically reclaimed for reassignment. Therefore, the dynamic address configuration is achieved. The cost and delay are also reduced.
2) Based on this architecture, the address configuration algorithm is proposed. In this algorithm, an AP or a vehicle owns the unique address space and can assign a unique address to a neighbor vehicle without DAD, so the uniqueness of an assigned address is ensured.
3) The control messages are transmitted within one-hop scope, so the scalability is obtained. The cost and delay are also lowered.
4) The identification of a vehicle can be authenticated, so the security is achieved.
XN Wang et al. [6] propose a secure IPv6 address configuration scheme for a MANET(Mobile ad hoc network). This scheme is based on one IP domain, and achieves the distributed address configuration for a MANET. Moreover, the security of this scheme is achieved via authentication.
However, as a special kind of MANET, a vehicular network has its own features. Taking these features into account, this work is totally different from the previous work [6] in the following aspects:
1) The network architectures are different. A vehicular network is a special type of MANET and it spans multiple IP domains. In a vehicular network, when a vehicle enters a new IP domain, its network prefix correspondingly changes. Therefore, the architecture in this scheme is based on multiple IP domains. In the previous work, a MANET is limited to one IP domain, so the network prefix of a mobile node keeps unchanged. Therefore, the architecture in the previous work is based on one IP domain.
2) The IPv6 address structures are different. In this scheme, the network architecture is based on road segments. In order to improve the address configuration performance and contribute to the hierarchical routing, an IPv6 address is made up of RS ID and node ID. In the previous work, the network architecture is based on the tree topology where a gateway node is the root. Correspondingly, an address consists of three parts which are the global routing prefix, the gateway node ID and the node ID.
3) The IPv6 address configuration algorithms are different. A distinctive feature of a vehicular network is high speed, so a vehicle frequently moves from one IP domain to another IP domain. When a vehicle enters a new IP domain, it must be configured with a new IP address. Therefore, a vehicle has to frequently acquire a new address and have the old address reclaimed. This scheme fully takes this characteristic into account and introduces the address exchange algorithm. This algorithm achieves both the address configuration and address reclamation at the same time, so the extra cost and delay caused by the address reclamation is avoided. In the previous work, a mobile node obtains an IPv6 address by joining a tree structure, and the address configuration and address reclamation are two independent processes. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related work on the address configuration is discussed in Section 2, the address configuration protocol for vehicular networks is presented in Section 3, and the security of this protocol is analyzed in Section 4. The address configuration performance is analyzed in Section 5, and this paper concludes with a summary in Section 6.
Related work
The IPv6 address configuration protocols, such as the stateful protocol and stateless protocol [2] , can configure a node with a unique address in the absence of intervention. However, these protocols have high cost and long delay, so they are unsuitable for multi-hop networks, such as a MANET or a vehicular network.
At present, some address configuration schemes are proposed for multi-hop networks, mainly including a MANET and a vehicular network.
Address schemes for MANET
Uttam Ghosh et al. [4] propose a secure IPv4 address configuration scheme. In this scheme, a new node first requests an address from a neighbor node. If the neighbor nodes do not have the address space, then the new node requests an address from a remote node. In the latter case, both the cost and the delay are increased. In [5] , a random function is employed to generate random numbers for address assignment. This scheme improves the address configuration performance, but it does not eliminate the address conflict. When the address conflict happens, it is solved by weak DAD or passive DAD. In this situation, the address configuration delay and cost are potentially increased. In [6] , a node obtains an address from a neighbor node without DAD, so the address configuration cost is reduced and the delay is avoided.
Sonia Mettali Gammar et al. [7] present an address configuration scheme for a MANET. In this scheme, the messages are transmitted within two-hop scope, so the address configuration cost and delay are reduced to an extent. However, when the address reclamation process is performed, almost every node needs to broadcast a message. Therefore, the network performance is degraded. In [8] , the architecture based on clusters is proposed and based on this architecture the address format is created. This scheme also addresses the address reclamation issue. However, the cluster maintenance consumes some network resources to some extent. In [9] , a node first gets its position information and then acquires an address based on location information. Since DAD is employed to ensure the address uniqueness, the address configuration performance is degraded. In [10] , a node acquires a unique address based on its location information without DAD, so the address configuration performance is improved substantially.
Hyojeong Shin et al. [11] utilize the RGB (Red, Green, Blue) coordinates to perform the address configuration. This scheme improves the address configuration performance, but it limits the network scalability. If the node density is high, the address configuration cost is increased substantially.
Elmurod Talipov et al. [12] use the time stamp and random ID to identify a node, so multiple nodes with the same ID and the same time stamp can not be distinguished and the address configuration may be falsely performed. In addition, different kinds of message pairs are employed to perform the communication, so the mapping between different kinds of message pairs degrades the address configuration performance.
In [13] , the network is organized into the tree topology and three types of nodes are defined: a root node, leader nodes, and normal nodes. Normal nodes work as intermediate nodes, and leader nodes are responsible for the address configuration and address reclamation. Inevitably, this centralized communication mode increases the address configuration cost to some extent.
Address configuration for vehicular networks
As a special kind of MANET, a vehicular network has its characteristics, such as high speed, so the address configuration scheme for vehicular networks must take these characteristics into account. At present, some address configuration schemes for vehicular networks are proposed.
In CAC (Centralized Address Configuration) [14] , a remote DHCP server configures all vehicles serially, so the address configuration delay grows to some extent. Moreover, if the speed is fast or the number of vehicles is large, then the packet loss rate also grows.
In [15] , each AP works as a DHCP server and can assign an address to a vehicle. An AP does not record the address assignment states, and all the address allocation states are maintained by a balanced server which is also responsible for reclaiming the address resources released by vehicles. After a balanced server returns the recovered address resources to an AP, the address loss can happen because the address buffer is limited.
In [16] , when a vehicle is entering a new serving area, it acquires a new address. If a vehicle is unable to communicate with any vehicle in the new area, it cannot acquire an address. Yuh-Shyan Chena et al. [17] improve the scheme [16] and propose an address scheme for vehicular networks. In this scheme, if a vehicle is leaving the serving area, then it passes its address to an intermediate From the above discussion, it can be seen that there are not any secure address configuration schemes for vehicular networks. Therefore, this paper presents a secure address configuration for vehicular networks in order to provide the address configuration security and also reduce the address configuration cost and delay.
Address configuration protocol

Architecture
The proposed architecture has the following design goals:
1) The architecture is based on multiple IP domains.
2) The architecture can help achieve the address configuration objectives, including dynamic, uniqueness, scalability and security. 
Address structure
Based on the proposed architecture, the address structure for vehicular networks is presented, as shown in Table 1 . In Table 1 , i is a positive integer, and its value is decided by the size of a vehicular network and the density of vehicles. Taking the generality into account, this protocol sets i to 16, as shown in Figure 1 .
In this way, one RS can include up to vehicles.
Address configuration algorithms
When a vehicle starts or enters a new RS, it must obtain a new IPv6 address to ensure the communication correctness. An AP or a vehicle periodically broadcasts a DSRC message, namely
BasicSafetyMessage [18] , and the payload includes its public key certificate authorized by CA (Certificate authority). The payload of a DSRC message broadcast by an LN or an EN also contains the addresses of both the next AP and the serving AP, and the one by an NN includes the size of its vehicle ID space.
In this scheme, after a vehicle receives a DSRC message from an AP or a vehicle, it acquires the public key certificate of the AP or vehicle and then computes the hash value with the AP or vehicle's public key and the well-known hash function. If the computed hash value is equal to the hash value embedded in the certificate, then the received public key is authenticated. In this way, a vehicle can get a neighbor AP or a vehicle's public key.
After a vehicle X becomes an EN, it does the following operations:
1) If X is moving from the RS RS1 to the RS RS2 and a vehicle Y is moving from the RS RS2 to the RS RS1, then X exchanges the address with Y in order to achieve the address configuration according to the algorithm in Section 3.3.1.
2) Otherwise, if X receives multiple DSRC messages from neighbour NNs, then it obtains an address from the neighbour NN with the maximum vehicle ID space according to the algorithm in Section 3.3.2.
3) Otherwise, X acquires an address from the next AP according to the algorithm in Section 3.3.3.
Address exchange
It is assumed that for the RS RS1 where the AP is AP1, the vehicle X is an LN and the vehicle Y is an EN, and for the RS RS2 where the AP is AP2, X is an EN and Y is an LN. After X receives a DSRC message from Y, X can acquire Y's public key PubK_Y and it can also determine that Y's next RS is its serving RS and Y's serving RS is its next RS. Therefore, X acquires an address in the next RS according to the following algorithm:
1) X first constructs an Ex_Addr message whose payload is its vehicle ID space and AP2's address. 
3) After X receives the E_Ex_Ack message, it fulfills the authentication process. If Y is authenticated, then X sets both its address and vehicle ID space to Y's ones. 
Address configuration from neighbour NN
It is assumed that for the RS RS1 where the AP is AP1 the vehicle X is an LN, and for the RS RS2
where the AP is AP2 X is an EN. If X receives multiple DSRC messages from neighbour NNs in RS2, 1) X constructs an E_Req_Addr message according to formulae (5) and (9), and then sends the E_Req_Addr message to AP1. 
Address reclamation
After a vehicle X is configured with an address where the vehicle ID is L, it constructs an Update message whose payload is its vehicle space [L+1, U], and acquires the signature Sign_Update with its private key PriK_X, as shown in formula (11) . Then, X appends Sign_Update to the Update message and encrypts the signed Update message into an E_Update message with the serving AP AP1's public key PubK_AP1, as shown in formula (12) . Finally, X sends the E_Update message to AP1. (14) . Finally, X sends the E_Release message to AP1.
After AP1 receives the E_Release message and authenticates X, it stores the Release message for 
Security analysis
This protocol achieves the security and avoids the malicious attacks related to dynamic address configuration, including address spoofing attack, address exhaustion attack, false address conflict attack and replay attack.
Address spoofing attack
In this protocol, a vehicle can ensure the uniqueness of an assigned IPv6 address without performing DAD process. If a malicious vehicle spoofs a good vehicle's address to flood a false DAD message, its neighbor vehicles first receive this DAD message. After the neighbor vehicles detect that this message is a DAD message, they abandon it because this protocol does not employ the DAD process to ensure the address uniqueness. Therefore, the flooding of false DAD messages is prevented.
If a malicious vehicle M spoofs an IP address of a good vehicle X to allocate an address to a vehicle Y, then it needs to return Y an address response message which must be signed by X's private key.
Since the malicious vehicle M does not know X's private key, it cannot generate the correct signature.
Therefore, Y can determine that M is a malicious vehicle.
In this way, the address spoof attack is avoided.
Address exhaustion attack
If a malicious vehicle M wants to request an address from a good vehicle or an AP, then it needs to send the good vehicle or AP an address request message which is signed by M's private key. However, M's public key can not be authenticated by CA, so the good vehicle or AP can detect that M is a malicious node and decline the address request.
In this way, the address exhaustion attack is avoided.
False address conflict attack
If a malicious vehicle M broadcasts an address conflict message, then its neighbor vehicles first receive this message. Because the neighbor vehicles cannot authenticate the malicious vehicle M, they abandon the address conflict message.
Moreover, this protocol achieves the address configuration without DAD, so it does not employ an address conflict message to ensure the uniqueness of an assigned address. Therefore, if a vehicle receives an address conflict message, then it can determine that this message comes from a malicious vehicle.
In this way, the flooding of false address conflict messages is prevented.
Replay attack
A malicious node M intercepts an encrypted address request message from a good vehicle X, and resends the same message to a vehicle Y to request an address in order to exhaust the address resources and consume network resources. After Y receives the encrypted address request message, it can abandon this message because the time stamp in the received message is expired.
A malicious node M intercepts an encrypted address response message from a good vehicle Y, and resends the same encrypted address response message to another node X in order to cause the address conflict. After X receives this encrypted address response message, it can discard this message because it can not decrypt the encrypted address response message with its private key.
In this way, the replay attack is avoided.
Experiment and evaluation
The existing address configuration protocol [17] is selected to compare with this protocol due to the following reasons:
1) It is a new address configuration protocol for vehicular networks.
2) It has better performance than the protocol [16] .
Analysis
The analytical method in [19] is employed to analyze the performance parameters of the proposed protocol and the existing protocol [17] .
1) Existing protocol
In the existing protocol, a leaving vehicle first forwards its address to an intermediate vehicle which Table 2 and 3. 2) Proposed protocol
In the situation (S1) that a vehicle acquires an address through the address exchange configuration,
an Ex_Addr message and an Ex_Ack message are used to perform the address configuration for two vehicles. Therefore, the upper bounds of the cost and delay for a vehicle acquiring an address are and respectively.
Proof. The upper bounds of the cost and delay of a vehicle sending an Ex_Addr message are and respectively. Also, the upper bounds of the cost and delay of a vehicle returning an Ex_Ack message are and respectively. The upper bounds of the cost and delay of processing a message are and respectively. Since the address exchange configuration achieves the address configuration for two vehicles, the upper bounds of the cost and delay of a vehicle acquiring an address are and respectively, as shown in Table 2 and 3.
! Address configuration from a neighbour vehicle
In the situation (S2) that a vehicle gets an address from a neighbour vehicle, a Req_Addr message and a Res_Addr message are used to perform the address configuration for a vehicle. Therefore, the upper bounds of the cost and delay for a vehicle acquiring an address are and respectively.
Proof. The upper bounds of the cost and delay of a vehicle sending a Req_Addr message are and respectively. Also, the upper bounds of the cost and delay of a vehicle returning a Res_Addr message are also and respectively. The upper bounds of the cost and delay of processing a message are and respectively. Therefore, the upper bounds of the cost and delay of a vehicle obtaining an address are and respectively, as shown in Table 2 
Simulation
We use ns-2 [20] to evaluate the performance, and the simulation parameters are shown in Table 4 .
The performance parameters include the address configuration cost, the address configuration delay, the packet loss rate and the address life. Among them, the address life means the interval from the time when an address is assigned to the time when the address is reclaimed. The address reclamation and reassignment can increase the address cost and delay. Therefore, the address life is an important indicator of the address configuration performance. The signature algorithm is RSA and the hash function is SHA-1. 
The effect of speed
When the transmission range is 300m and the vehicle arrival rate is 0.3vps, the address configuration cost, the address configuration delay, the packet loss rate and the address life are shown in Figure 5 , 6, 7 and 8. In this protocol, a vehicle obtains an address from a neighbor node while in the existing protocol a vehicle gets an address from an intermediate node multi-hop away. Therefore, the address configuration cost and delay in this protocol are lower. The increase in the speed can cause the growth in the packet loss rate [21] . In this protocol a vehicle gets an address from a neighbor node while in the existing protocol a vehicle obtains an address from an intermediate node multi-hop away. In addition, the address configuration cost and delay in this protocol are smaller, as shown in Figure 5 and 6, so the packet loss rate in the proposed protocol is lower, as shown in Figure 7 . constant, the address life also tends to be steady, as shown in Figure 8 .
In this protocol, only in S4 an LN's address is reclaimed, so the address life is longer than the one in the existing protocol.
The effect of transmission range
When the speed is 30m/s and the vehicle arrival rate is 0.3vps, the address configuration cost, the address configuration delay, the packet loss rate and the address life are shown in Figure 9 , 10, 11 and 12. Figure 9 Address configuration cost based on transmission range Figure 10 Address configuration delay based on transmission range
In this protocol, with the increase in transmission range, the number of the vehicles acquiring an address in S1 and S2 grows, so the average address configuration cost and delay decrease. In the existing protocol, with the increase in transmission range, the distance between an entering vehicle and a leaving vehicle releasing an address reduces, so the average configuration cost and delay also decrease. In this protocol a vehicle obtains an address from a neighbor node while in the existing protocol a vehicle obtains an address from an intermediate node multi-hop away. Therefore, the address configuration cost and delay in this protocol are lower, as shown in Figure 9 and 10. Figure 11 Packet loss rate based on transmission range
In this protocol, with the increase in transmission range, the probability of a vehicle acquiring an address in S1 and S2 grows, so the average address configuration cost and delay are reduced. As a result, the packet loss rate is also decreased. In the existing protocol, with the increase in the transmission range, the distance between an entering vehicle and a leaving vehicle releasing an address is decreased, so the packet loss rate is also reduced. In this protocol the address configuration cost and delay are smaller and a vehicle acquires an address from a neighbor node, so the packet loss rate is lower, as shown in Figure 11 . In this protocol, with the increase in transmission range, the probability of a vehicle acquiring an address in S1 and S2 grows, so the average address life increases. In the existing protocol, with the increase in transmission range, the distance between an entering vehicle and a leaving vehicle releasing an address decreases, so the probability of an entering vehicle acquiring an address from an intermediate vehicle keeping a leaving vehicle's address grows. As a result, the address life is increased, as shown in Figure 12 .
The effect of vehicle arrival rate
When the transmission range is 300m and the speed is 30m/s, the address configuration cost, the address configuration delay, the packet loss rate and the address life are shown from Figure 13 In this protocol, with the increase in vehicle arrival rate, the total number of vehicles grows, so the probability of the vehicles acquiring an address in S1 and S2 increases. As a result, the average address configuration cost and delay decrease. In the existing protocol, the vehicle arrival rate has no relation to the distance between an entering vehicle and a leaving vehicle releasing an address, so the average configuration cost and delay tend to be steady. The retransmission caused by the packet loss results in the slight growth in the cost and delay, as shown in Figure 13 and 14.
Figure15 Packet loss rate based on vehicle arrival rate
With the increase in vehicle arrival rate, the address configuration cost in the proposed protocol decreases, as shown in Figure 13 . Therefore, when the vehicle arrival rate increases, the packet loss rate reduces. In the existing protocol, the vehicle arrival rate has no relation to the average address configuration cost, so the cost is steady. When the vehicle arrival rate increases, the total traffic also grows. Since an entering vehicle obtains an address from a vehicle multi-hop away, the growth in the traffic degrades the network performance. As a result, the packet loss rate increases, as shown in Figure 15 .
Figure16 Address life based on vehicle arrival rate
In this protocol, with the increase in vehicle arrival rate, the probability of a vehicle acquiring an address in S1 and S2 grows. As a result, the address life is prolonged. In the existing protocol, when the vehicle arrival rate increases, the number of intermediate vehicles staying between an entering vehicle and a leaving vehicle also grows. Therefore, the probability of an entering vehicle acquiring an address from an intermediate vehicle keeping a leaving vehicle's address also increases. As a result, the address life is increased.
Conclusion and future work
This paper proposes a secure address configuration protocol for IPv6-based vehicular networks. In this protocol, a vehicle obtains a unique address from a neighbor node without DAD, and the address space can be automatically reclaimed for reassignment. Therefore, the cost and delay are reduced.
Moreover, the control messages are transmitted within one-hop scope, so the scalability is achieved.
The identification of a vehicle can be authenticated, so the security is ensured.
This protocol assumes that the distance between a vehicle and its serving AP is one-hop. In our future work, we plan to study the secure IPv6 address configuration for vehicular networks where the distance between a vehicle and its serving AP is multi-hop.
